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In the extensive literature that has been dedicated during the past fifteen years to the analysis of 
the reform of the welfare states, a significant number of studies have focused on the 
characterisation of the nature and direction of the changes in the main social programmes. This 
article seeks to contribute to this debate by analysing the reform of unemployment insurance 
schemes between 1993 and 2007 in France, Germany, Portugal and Spain, as representative of 
the conservative regime. A comparative analysis is carried out by examining the major 
legislative amendments concerning eligibility criteria and entitlement conditions, as they are 
expressed by legislation in the four countries. The findings of the study indicate that the four 
countries have adopted different instruments at different moments in time, while no significant 
differences were detected between them, and that the legislative changes introduced in the four 
insurance schemes may be seen to constitute a real erosion of social rights.  
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Since the mid-1990s, a large body of literature has been devoted to the analysis of 
welfare state reform, particularly in Western Europe, by virtue of the important 
challenges shared, to different extents, by all countries. The external pressures 
(globalisation) and/or internal pressures (ageing population, slower economic growth, 
high and persistent unemployment, transformation of the household structure and the 
EMU-related constraints on public spending) have been identified as the major drivers 
of social change (e.g. Buti et al. 2000; Ferrera and Rhodes 2000; Kuhnle 2000; Huber 
and Stephens 2001; Iversen 2001; Pierson 2001a; Powell and Hewitt 2002; Corrado et 
al. 2003; Korpi 2003; Castles 2004; Kittel and Winner 2005).    2
    It was taken for granted that such pressures on the sustainability of the welfare states 
would lead governments to embark on a process of down-sizing their social provision 
i.e. a process of retrenchment. However, the seminal work of Pierson (1994, 1996) 
refocused the academic debate by stressing the resilience of the welfare state.  Two 
major conclusions were drawn (Pierson 1996:173-4): firstly, although cuts in individual 
social programmes were effectively made, there was no radical change; and second, the 
fundamental structures of the welfare states were maintained (i.e., in Germany, Sweden 
and the UK, over the period 1974-1990).  
    Representing the historic institutional approach to the retrenchment question – the 
new institutionalism – Pierson has explained the unexpected resistance of the welfare 
state as the result of ´powerful groups surrounding social programs` (1996:2). 
Consequently, any policy reforms would ´confront not only the potential opposition of 
voters and program beneficiaries`, but also ´the veto points within formal political 
institutions and path-dependent processes` (1998: 552). The ´new politics` of the 
welfare state developed by Pierson became widely accepted in the literature, as opposed 
to the ´old politics` represented by the structural and power resources approaches which 
have explained the process of expansion (Starke 2006:105). However, the path-
dependence thesis was already found in the theoretical contribution of Esping-Andersen 
(1990, 1996, and 1999), according to whom the process of reform follows from the 
existing policy arrangements and only adaptive measures are taken. Within the 
theoretical literature dealing with the explanations of the development process of the 
welfare state, the contributions of Esping-Andersen and Pierson are widely viewed as 
the most important theoretical arguments in favour of the welfare state’s resilience 
(Taylor-Gooby 2002).  
    For more than a decade, the interest of many researchers has been focused on the 
nature and degree of welfare change. The academic debate has been dominated by two 
questions related to ´the dependent variable problem` (Green-Pedersen 2004, 2007): the 
theoretical and the operational definitions of retrenchment. The former definition deals 
with the identification of the welfare changes that could be classified as retrenchment; 
the latter involves the selection of the most appropriate indicators for its measurement. 
In addition, some researchers attempted to identify the differences in the dynamics of 
reform that were applied in different welfare regimes during the period of expansion 
(Palier 2001).   3
        Several authors aimed to find an answer to the first issue. Pierson (1994, 1996) 
distinguished between programmatic changes (cutback of particular programmes) and 
structural changes (significant increase in the reliance on means testing, major transfer 
of responsibility to the private sector and dramatic changes in benefits and eligibility 
rules). A similar conceptualisation of welfare retrenchment was adopted by Bonoli and 
Palier (1998),who distinguished between path-dependent changes (cuts in welfare 
programmes without changing the established set of principles) and innovative changes 
(those affecting the institutional factors such as the claiming principle, benefit structure, 
financing and actors).    
    In relation to operational issues, the empirical research has revealed two important 
changes related to analytical focus and indicators. The macro-analysis of the welfare 
state, in particular the use of expenditure indicators – social expenditure as a percentage 
of GDP – to measure the welfare change, has been criticised by several authors (e.g. 
Pierson 1996; Clayton and Pontusson 1998; Korpi 2003; Allan and Scruggs 2004; 
Green-Pedersen 2004). Thus, an alternative approach has found consensus among 
researchers: the analysis of specific areas of social policy (Vail 2004; Green-Pedersen 
and Haverland 2002) through qualitative indicators, i.e., institutional characteristics of 
welfare programmes (Bonoli and Palier 1998) or, more recently, the ´social rights` 
(Siegel 2003).  
    The net rate of replacement as a measure of social rights was used, for example, by 
Korpi and Palme (2003) and by Allan and Scruggs (2004), who analysed unemployment 
insurance (1975-1995) and sickness benefit (1975-1999) in OECD countries. They 
became representative of the ´amended` power-resources approach, which argues that 
certain radical reforms have been undertaken which cause a ´race-to-the-bottom` in 
respect of social rights. Compared to expenditure data, the replacement rate has the 
advantage of not being affected by increases in the number of beneficiaries, but cannot 
capture all the changes in eligibility and entitlement rules (Green-Pedersen 2004:8). 
    Studies at policy level and involving many European countries have been carried out 
by several authors who examined legislative changes on major social programs: 
pensions, sickness and unemployment (e.g. Bonoli and Palier 1998; Myles and 
Quadagno 1997; Clasen 2000; Myles and Pierson 2001; Taylor-Gooby 2001; Wood 
2001). These studies presented divergent conclusions on the nature of welfare changes: 
they found either path-dependent or innovative/structural changes.     4
        Taking into account the advantages of the typology approach to the comparative 
analysis (Taylor-Gooby 1999; Levy 1999), many studies have also focused on 
variations in the reform process across regime types (examples of large cross-national 
studies are Bonoli et al. 2000, Ferrera and Rhodes 2000, Kuhnle 2000, Scharpf and 
Schmidt 2000, and Pierson 2001).  From these and other empirical studies, some 
general conclusions are possible (see review in Sainsbury 2001, Lindbom 2002, Taylor-
Gooby 2002, and Powell 2004).
 First, the thesis of retrenchment, as radical change, is 
been rejected by numerous studies which conclude that welfare states have responded to 
pressures through adaptation (Taylor-Gooby 2002: 601). Second, two dominant policy 
direction are identified: cost-containment (measures aiming to control current and future 
social spending) and activation (measures designed to reduce the dependency on the 
State).  
    With regard to this debate, there is an important issue related to the ambiguities that 
have characterised the efforts to categorise the welfare state change (Sainsbury 
2001:260): “there seems to be an assumption that ´newness`, no matter its form, is 
automatically better”. If we can accept that the reform did not dismantle the welfare 
state, we can put into question what the legislative changes mean from the point of view 
of public provision and social rights. This was the aim of the following three empirical 
studies that have in common three methodological options: i) analysis of a specific 
social program (unemployment protection); ii) selection of qualitative indicators; and 
iii) the typology approach.  
    Clasen et al. (2001) aimed to evaluate the extent of work- conditionality – as the 
degree to which benefit eligibility and entitlement is dependent on employment - within 
unemployment protection (insurance and assistance schemes) in Denmark, Sweden and 
Finland (social-democratic regime) and then compare them with Germany, the 
Netherlands (conservative regime) and the UK (liberal regime).  Analysing the 
legislative changes according to four criteria (benefit access, benefit level, benefit 
duration and obligations on the part of recipients) over a period of 20 years (1980s and 
1990s), the study revealed a shift towards a stronger element of work-conditionally for 
unemployed people across all countries, with some specifications by criterion: the work 
requirement was explicitly increased in benefit access and obligations across all 
countries, while the level and maximum duration of benefit became more work-
conditional in the conservative regime.    5
    In  order  to  identify  different  profiles of reform trajectories, Clasen and Clegg 
(2007:7) analysed the reforms of unemployment insurance (major legislative changes 
relating membership of a defined category of support, qualifying period and behavioural 
conditions over the period 1980-2003) in France, Germany, the UK, and Denmark. One 
conclusion can be stressed: Germany and France showed similar trajectories in respect 
of focus changes in the conditions of eligibility after 1990, despite the differences 
between groups of unemployed, with both countries emphasising activation later than 
Denmark and the UK. 
    Clegg (2007) analysed the unemployment policies over the period 1985-2003 in four 
conservative regimes (Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands). The study 
concluded that an accumulation of small changes were implemented in Belgium, 
Germany and France while a substantive reform took place in the Netherlands. In 
addition to a selective activation, a qualified cost-containment (selective expansion, cuts 
in level and duration of benefits and stricter eligibility requirements) and a reactionary 
recalibration (more contributiveness in benefits entitlement, reduced and enhanced 
protection for those with no/atypical and long work histories, respectively) were 
implemented in all countries (p. 610-611).  
    The results of the three selected studies reveal two important aspects of the reforms 
implemented prior to 2003: first, there has been a considerable change in unemployment 
protection; second, some differences between and within welfare regimes were 
observed. These findings justify the continuation of this line of research.  
    Accordingly, the present article aims to analyse the reform of the unemployment 
insurance schemes during the period 1993-2007 in Germany, France, Portugal and 
Spain, all four of which represent the conservative regime. We will analyse the 
legislative changes concerning eligibility criteria and entitlement conditions as they are 
expressed by legislation in the four countries. With this study, we seek to ascertain 
whether reforms in the four schemes followed a path-dependence trajectory, or not and 
have, or have not, determined an erosion of social rights. With regard to the earlier 
empirical studies, the article presents two contributions: the analyses of the more recent 
reforms and the selection of two countries that are less frequently studied empirically, 
namely Portugal and Spain.  
    The structure of the article is as follows. In the next section, we briefly discuss the 
main reasons for the analysis of unemployment protection reform and two 
methodological options. Section 2 identifies the legislatives changes between 1993 and   6
2007, by each rule concerning eligibility and entitlement and by country. Section 3 
provides a brief analysis of the direction of all changes in all four countries, and section 
4 concludes. 
 
The analysis of unemployment protection reform: why and how 
Why analyse? 
For a long time, empirical research was focused mainly on old-age pensions as the 
major social programme in financial terms, as well as the number of beneficiaries, 
throughout  the European countries (e.g. Myles and Quadagno 1997, Taylor-Gooby 
1999, Myles and Pierson 2001, Bonoli 2003, Schludi 2005, Green-Pedersen and 
Lindbom 2006, Bonoli and Palier 2007 and Jochem 2007). More recently, as mentioned 
above, unemployment protection reform across a group of European countries has also 
been the analytical focus of many empirical studies.   
    Despite being a social program with more restricted coverage and therefore, much 
less expensive compared with old-age pensions and health care, unemployment 
protection has also been the subject of many legislative changes in all western European 
countries over the last two decades. Two main motives can explain the political option 
of reforming the unemployment protection (Clasen and Clegg 2006; Clasen 2000). 
Firstly there is an economic argument, insofar as persistently high unemployment has a 
two-fold negative effect on public budgets by increasing social expenditure and 
lowering receipt in tax and/or social contributions. A second motive takes into account 
the social limits of traditional unemployment insurance schemes in the context of new 
labour market conditions. These two lines of argument could explain changes in 
eligibility and entitlement rules in order to reduce unemployment expenses, as well as 
some more structural changes.  
    Assuming that the governments have adopted the new strategy of blame-avoidance 
(Pierson 2001b), any welfare reform is implemented in such a way as to minimise the 
impact on public opinion. Thus, it would seem to be of value to measure the popularity 
of the unemployment protection.  
    Having analysed attitude survey data (1985-1996) in Sweden, Germany and the UK, 
as representative of the three regime types proposed by Esping-Andersen, Taylor-
Gooby (2001:139) argues that a selective program such as unemployment protection 
has, in contrast to those with comprehensive coverage (like old-age pension schemes), 
less public support. This can be explained by the perception that such benefits “are less   7
legitimate, or because they command a weaker constituency of self-interest”. The weak 
support found for cost-containment, in addition to the low level of willingness to pay, 
leads the author to conclude that a policy of activation is easier to implement than 
measures targeting the reduction of social expenditure (Ibid: 145). 
    In order to explain specifically the public support for cuts in unemployment benefits 
spending, Fraile and Ferrer (2005) analysed comparative data for the second half of the 
1990s in 13 OECD countries (not including Portugal), coming to two main conclusions 
(p.467-472). First, the extent of public support varies significantly across the countries, 
between percentages higher than 30 percent (e.g. France) and lower than 10 percent 
(e.g. Spain), but there is no link between the degree of public support and the welfare 
regime type. Second, confronted by persistently highs levels of unemployment, citizens 
feel more concern for the unemployed, while the latter always react negatively to a 
reduction in unemployment spending.  
    The conclusions of these empirical studies enable us to highlight two points. First, 
while the unemployment protection receives less public support, its reform should focus 
more on activation than on cost-containment. Second, significant differences are not to 
be expected between the reforms carried out in different countries, regardless of 
whether they belong to the same welfare regime or not. 
 
How to analyse? 
An important methodological option relates to the selection of the most appropriate 
indicator by which to measure the welfare change. With regard to the unemployment 
policy, social expenditure as a percentage of GDP presents a major limitation: 
expenditure can rise due to increasing levels of unemployment without any change in 
eligibility and entitlement rules. However, it is important to bear in mind that the share 
of unemployment expenditure does not always correlate with the unemployment rate 
(Table 1).  
    For example, in 1993, the share of unemployment expenditure was very similar in 
France and Germany, in spite of their quite different unemployment rates.  In 2006, 
expenditure on the Spanish scheme was double that of the Portuguese scheme, with 
unemployment rates of 8.5% and 7.8% respectively. Besides the differing levels of GDP 
growth, these disparities reveal very different degrees of coverage and/or generosity.  
 
   8
 
Table 1  
Standardised unemployment rates and unemployment expenditure as % of GDP 
 
  1993  94 95 96 97 98 99  2000  01 02 03 04  05  06 
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Key: UEX/GDP = unemployment expenditure as % of GDP; UR = unemployment rates 
Source: Eurostat (2004; 2008, 2008a) and OECD (2005, 2006, 2008) 
 
 
        From 1993 until 2001, the ratio experienced a downward trend, which would be 
partly due to the declining level of unemployment. The reduction in 1994, with the 
exception of Portugal, where the unemployment rates showed an increase, can be 
explained by modifications in the legislation. In 2002, the share of unemployment 
expenditure showed a small increase in all countries, resulting from the deterioration of 
the labour market. Since it is clear that unemployment expenditure is in fact counter-
cyclical, it is noteworthy that the upsurge in the unemployment rate in France and 
Germany over the period 2002-2004 did not cause a higher social expenditure. Once 
again, the decline in the ratio can be explained by reforms of the unemployment 
protection schemes.  
    From the 1993-2006 figures, we may conclude that the quantitative measure is not 
the best indicator because it ignores cross-national variations and changes over time in 
the coverage and generosity of unemployment protection schemes. Therefore, we base 
our analysis on seven criteria that encompass eligibility (qualifying period, main 
conditions of payment and waiting period) and entitlement (reference earnings and rates 
of benefits, duration of payment and taxation), in order to characterise the direction of 
changes introduced over time as well as identify differences and similarities across the 
four national schemes. The analysis is limited to legislative changes introduced in 
insurance schemes in a context of full unemployment over the period 1993-2007. This 
period includes fourteen reforms: France (1996, 2001, 2002 and 2006); Germany (1994,   9
1995, 1997 and 2004); Portugal (1999, 2003 and 2006); and Spain (1994, 2002 and 
2006).  
    As the data base, we used the Mutual Information System on Social Protection in the 
Member States of the European Union (MISSOC). The information that is reported 
annually by the European Commission makes it possible to identify the main changes 
that have occurred in each country. Moreover, two further complementary sources were 
used: the database of the International Reform Monitor (Portugal not included), and 
NATLEX from the ILO.
1 
    The  second  methodological  option  refers to the choice of case studies: France, 
Germany, Portugal and Spain. There is a consensus on the classification of the first two 
countries in the same welfare regime, despite the different names, given as: conservative 
(Esping-Andersen 1990), Bismarckian (Ferrera 1996), continental (Bonoli 1997) or 
corporatist (Korpi and Palme 1998). The same is not true with the classification of 
Portugal and Spain. Indeed, their classification, together with Italy and Greece, in a 
southern model (Ferrera 1996; Bonoli 1997) can be challenged with several arguments 
(Arcanjo 2006). Here, we advocate that the four countries belong to the same welfare 
regime (conservative), despite the relatively less developed welfare states of the Latin 
countries. Two common characteristics of the four insurance schemes can be identified: 
the access to benefits is dependent on a specific volume of contributions and the benefit 
level and duration of payment is determined by the insurance career (Clasen 2001: 645).  
    In relation to previous empirical work, this selection of countries presents two aspects 
that should be highlighted: first, the inclusion of two of the least studied countries 
(Portugal and Spain); and second, the comparative analysis within the conservative 
regime, rather than examining ways in which it contrasts with the other regimes, which 
has been the most common approach in the literature (Palier and Martin 2007: 535).   
 
 
The institutional changes between 1993 and 2007 
The literature concerned with the institutional design of unemployment compensation 
usually identifies three methods of protection: an insurance system (eligibility depends 
on the individual’s contribution record and benefits are earnings-related), an assistance 
system (eligibility depends on a means test and benefits are flat-rate), or a combination 
                                                 
1 The International Reform Monitor is a project carried out by the Bertelsmann Foundation, which 
provides online information on social policy in 15 OECDE countries (Portugal not included). The ILO´s 
NATLEX database provides abstracts of legislation.    10
of these two schemes into a dual system. In 1993, all the four countries analysed 
operated a dual system, i.e. a combination of an insurance scheme with an assistance 
scheme. In all insurance schemes, membership is  compulsory, following the 
contributory principle, which is a means of avoiding adverse selection (Kvist 1998:40). 
All of the countries restrict social protection to wage earners and pay the typical 
earnings-related benefits.
2  Next, we will proceed to analyse the changes in the four 
countries during the period studied, in addition to the means of implementation, 
according to the respective legal parameters and rules concerning eligibility and 
entitlement.  
 
Eligibility: qualifying period 
The purpose of the qualifying period is to limit benefit eligibility to claimants who fulfil 
a certain work requirement which may be expressed by three factors: a minimum work 
record, a relevant work period and the work intensity (Clasen et al. 2001). In all four 
countries, the work requirement has been expressed by a minimum work record and a 
relevant work period (Table 2).   
 
Table 2   
 Qualifying period under the insurance scheme 
 
 1993  2007 
France  4 months in the last 8 months (a)  6 months  in the last 22 months (c) 
Germany  12 months in the last 3 years   12 months in the last 2  years (d)  
Portugal  18 months in the last 2 years   No change (e) 
Spain  12 months in the last 6 years (b)  No change  
(a)  Reform of 1992 (Before: 3 months in last 8 months);  (b) Reform of 1992 (Before: 6 months in last 6 years); (c)  
Reform of 2002 (Reform of 2001: 4 months in last 18 months); (d) Reform of 2004 (For new entitlements after 1 
February 2006); (e) Reform of 2003.  
Source: MISSOC (several years).  
 
 
In order to facilitate the comparative analysis, as well as that of the extent of changes, 
we have calculated the ratio between the first two factors mentioned above (Clasen et 
al. 2001).  
    In 1993, the countries were ranked as follows: Spain (0.17), Germany (0.33), France 
(0.50) and Portugal (0.75). Over the course of the subsequent fourteen years, the picture 
changed in two countries, where the work requirement shows a reverse trend: in 
Germany, the qualifying period became more stringent (the ratio amounted to 0.50), 
while in France, the work requirement became one of the more generous (the ratio fell 
                                                 
2 In all countries, unemployed persons can claim unemployment assistance benefits when they are not 
eligible for insurance benefit or have exhausted entitlement to insurance benefits.   11
to 0.27) which can be explained by the combined changes in the minimum work record 
and the relevant work period. Portugal and Spain presented no changes. 
3 The increase 
in the work-relatedness resulting from reforms in other European countries (for 
example, the UK, Netherlands, Belgium and Finland) is only evident in Germany.  
 
Eligibility: main conditions of payment  
In 1993, the four insurance schemes all required the claimants to be involuntarily 
unemployed, registered at a public employment office and capable and available for 
work. The conditions for receipt of an unemployment insurance benefit became 
progressively more restrictive in all the countries over the period 1993-2007. The issue 
of the unemployed returning to work dominates all recent reforms in EU  countries 
(MISSOC-Info 2004). Some examples illustrate this common trend: stricter definitions 
of availability for work in relation to active job-seeking and acceptance of job offers 
(definition of a suitable job and the geographical rules). Nevertheless, in the late-1990s 
and after 2001, the activation measures were reinforced with, for example, specific 
programmes for high-risk groups, individual action plans to aid the efforts to return to 
work and tougher sanctions on those refusing training courses or job offers
4.  Observed 
together these measures can be classified as a major change in unemployment 
protection. Indeed, even if almost no other legal parameters were altered, the policy of 
activation weakened the traditional relationship between contributions and eligibility 
requirement. In view of the significant amendment introduced, this policy re-orientation 
can be classified as an innovative or systemic change (Palier 2002: 107). 
 
Eligibility: waiting period 
In 1993, three countries had no waiting period (Germany, Portugal and Spain) while in 
France it was 7 days. There were no changes during the period.  
 
Entitlement: reference earnings and rates of benefits  
We now turn to the factors that determine the amount of the unemployment insurance 
benefits, i.e. the (gross) rates of replacement (Table 3) and the earnings taken as 
reference (Table 4).  
                                                 
3 In Portugal, the creation of the Employment and Social Protection Programme, which included special 
(and temporary) measures for new claimants from March 2003, had no effect on the ratio. For more 
details, see MISSOC-Info 01/2004. 
4 For a more detailed analysis of activation policies, see, for example, Clasen (2002, Part C, pp.197-255), 
Barbier and Ludwing-Mayerhofer (2004), Taylor-Gooby (2004, 2008) and Dingeldey (2007).    12
Table 3  
Rates of unemployment insurance benefits 
 
 1993  2007 
France  57,4% with a limit of 75%; downward 
sliding scale (a) 
Fixed scale (b) 
 
Germany  68%, or 63% without children  67%,  or 60%  without children (c) 
Portugal 65%    No change 
Spain  70% during the last 6 months for up to 180 
days; afterwards 60% (d) 
No change 
 
(a)  Reform of 1992: introduction of the degressivity principle (the full rate is decreased every 4 months); (b) 
Reform of 2001 (in 1996: periods at which degressivity apply lengthened from every 4 months to every 6); (c) 
Reform of 1997; (d) Reform of 1992 (before: 80% and 70%) 
Source: MISSOC (several years)  
 
 
A system of rates is used by three countries: in Germany, the rates vary according to 
family status (better for claimants with children), while in France and Spain, the rate 
decreases in function of the unemployment spell (better for short-term unemployment). 
We can observe that in 1993 the replacement rate varied between 57.4% (France) and 
70% (Spain). It should be noted that we are only concerned with gross replacement 
rates, which are not a good measure of the degree of generosity of different schemes, 
since taxation and social contribution incidence are not included (see next section 
below)
5.  
    In respect of the earnings taken as reference we find a wide diversity in the time 
period over which benefit calculations were based (Table 4). In 1993, it varied between 
3 months (Germany) and 12 months (Portugal and France). 
 
Table 4  
Earnings taken as reference in insurance schemes 
 
 1993  2007 
France  average earnings during the last 12 months  No change 
Germany  average earnings for the last 3 months  Average earnings for the last 12 months (a) 
Portugal  average earnings during the 12 months 




Spain  average earnings during the last 6 months  No change 
(a)  Reform of 1995 (in force from 1998). Reform of 1994: last 6 months. 
Source: MISSOC (several years)  
 
 
In addition, the setting of a maximum benefit amount (and/or a minimum) must be 
analysed, because it “breaches significantly the principle of equivalence or reciprocity 
                                                 
5 Depending on the tax system and social contributions incidence, the net rate of replacement may be 
higher or lower than the gross rate, which implies an increase or decrease of generosity, respectively.    13
i.e. the correspondence between contributions and benefit” (Clasen 2001:645). In 
Portugal and Spain, a maximum and a minimum amount are set; the Spanish scheme 
has a special feature, i.e. the minimum amount varies according to the number of 
dependent children. In France, there was only a minimum amount. In a simplified way, 
we could say that the more generous schemes (combining this item with the rate of 
benefit) were found in Germany and Spain. 
    By fourteen years later, none of the structural features of the insurance scheme had 
been altered. However, we can identify some trends towards a new direction: i) in 
Germany, the time period used to calculate the benefit was increased (the last 12 months 
instead of the last 3 months) and the benefit rates were decreased, which produced a 
double effect towards a more restrictive entitlement, i.e. lower benefits; ii) in France, 
the sliding scale of benefits was abandoned; in terms of the amount of benefit, the new 
fixed scale penalises longer spells of unemployment less than its predecessor; and iii) in 
Spain, the maximum benefit became variable according to the number of children 
(170%, 195% or 220% of the MW), replacing the previous single rate (220% of the 
MW), which translates into lower maximum benefits for beneficiaries with few or no 
dependent children. 
 
Entitlement: duration of payment 
With regard to the duration of payment, one of two principles may be applied in the 
insurance schemes: a fixed period or a variable maximum period which may be 
dependent on the labour market status (the insured’s employment record) and/or the 
personal status (age) (Kvist 1998: 48). Table 5 presents the situation in 1993 and 2007. 
 
 
Table 5  
 Duration of payment: insurance schemes 
 
 1993  2007 
France  From 4 months to 60 months, according 
to insurance work  and age  
From 7 months   to 36 months (a) 
 
Germany  From 6 months to 32 months, according 
to insurance work and age 
From  6  months to 24 months  (b)  
 
Portugal  From 10 months to 30 months, according 
to age 
From 9 months to 24 months, according to 
age and insurance work (c)     
Spain  From 4 months to 24 months, according 
to insurance work  
No change  
(a) Reform of 2006 (in 2002: from 7 to 42 months); (b) Reform of 2004 (in force 2006): 6 to 36; Reform of 1995 (in 
force from 1998) decreased duration for old-age unemployed; (c) Reform of 2006:  a bonus was established (30 or 60 
days extra for every 5 years of insurance during the last 20 years). Reform of 1999: from 12 to 30 months. 
Source: MISSOC (several years)    14
 
 
In 1993, all the countries operated with a variable period, but with different determining 
factors:  i) in France and Germany the duration of benefit was positively related to the 
previous work record and age; ii) In Spain, the duration depended on the length of 
insurance; and iii) in Portugal, the age was the guideline principle. Over the period, 
Portugal joined the first cluster.  
    In 1993, there was much diversity in the duration of insurance benefit, mainly in 
terms of the maximum duration, with France having the most generous scheme and 
Spain the least
6. Over the period, the duration of payment has been successively 
changed in three countries, but in different ways. Some convergence can be observed in 
the maximum duration, which has been reduced in all these three countries, while the 
minimum duration has undergone an opposite change in France (increase) and Portugal 
(decrease). Some general trends can be highlighted: i) in all countries, the work record 
has been increasingly important in determining the duration of payment (minimum and 
maximum); ii) the duration has been tightened for older unemployed people, despite a 
less favourable change for those with a longer insurance record.  
 
 
Entitlement: taxation of unemployment benefits and social contributions 
In 1993, the four countries were clustered into two groups according to the tax treatment 
of the unemployment insurance benefits as well as the social contributions. The first 
group comprised Germany,  Portugal and Spain, where the benefits were subject to 
neither tax nor social contributions. France was the only country where the benefits 
were subject to taxation (after a deduction) and social contributions. After 1994, Spain 
followed the French example.  
 
What has been changed and how 
There is some evidence that the four selected countries have made changes to their 





                                                 
6 All schemes offer extended periods beyond the maximum duration up to pensionable age to older 
unemployed people with a long contributory record.   15
 
Table 6  
Direction of changes in the indicators  
 
  France Germany Portugal Spain 
Eligibility        
Qualifying period  - R  + R    
Conditions of payment  + R  + R  + R  + R 
Entitlement         
Earnings reference     - G    
Rate of benefit  + G (a)  - G    
Duration of payment   ± R (b)  +R  +R   
Tax and social contributions       - G 
Key: R= restrictive; G= generous; more (+), less (-), or differences  
between groups of unemployed persons (±). 
(a)  For longer unemployed; (b) More restricted for older unemployed.  
Source: Elaborated by the author 
 
The changes introduced in the four insurance schemes reveal restrictions in eligibility 
and entitlement criteria, although to different extents. All countries attempted to curb 
unemployment expenditure growth, but by introducing changes to their insurance 
scheme, adopting a different mix of instruments. However, we can highlight one trend 
that is common to all countries: eligibility has been tightened by means of more 
restrictive conditions of payment, mainly by activation measures.  
    Germany introduced legislative changes in almost all items concerning eligibility and 
entitlement. Moreover, it must be noted that the gross rate of benefit – perhaps the most 
conspicuous change - has been reduced only in this country.  In contrast, Portugal and 
Spain have used the lowest number of instruments.  
    We can also conclude that unemployment reforms have been implemented by stages 
over the period of analysis. However, there are important differences between countries: 
Spain adopted tougher reforms in 1993 and few adjustments later; in Portugal, the 
process of reform was initiated later (1999), with the most significant change being 
implemented only in 2006; the French and German schemes experienced legislative 
amendments over the period, the most important of which were implemented after 
2001.  
    There is some evidence of cutbacks in eligibility and entitlement criteria. These cuts 
may be seen as a diminution of social rights, with a significant impact when the result 
has been a reduction in the number of unemployed entitled to protection. Additionally, 
there is evidence that the Portuguese and Spanish insurance schemes do not reveal any 
structural difference from the other two.    16
 
Conclusion 
This article has endeavoured to contribute to the discussion on unemployment 
protection reform by analysing the reform process in four western European countries 
(France, Germany, Portugal and Spain), all of which represent the conservative regime 
of welfare. The empirical analysis focused on legislative changes implemented over the 
period 1993-2007 in relation to eligibility and entitlement rules. With respect to earlier 
empirical studies on unemployment protection reform, the article presents two 
contributions: an analysis of the most recent reforms (after 2003) and the selection of 
two of the least studied countries (Portugal and Spain). 
      Three main conclusions can be highlighted. First, in addition to the activation 
measures, which may be classified as the major change in the domain of unemployment 
protection, there is some evidence of cutbacks in eligibility and entitlement criteria. The 
legislative changes implemented in France, German, Portugal and Spain may be viewed 
as constituting a diminution of social rights for many unemployed people. The measures 
identified, particularly from 2003 onwards, validate findings of previous empirical 
studies. Indeed, they reflect not only a trend of recommodification (Green-Pedersen 
2001; Lindbom 2002), i.e. the consequence of efforts to restrict the alternatives to 
participation in the labour market, but they also represent a process of dualisation of the 
population protected, with a restricted protection for the ´outsiders`, such as the young 
(Clegg 2007; Palier and Martin 2007). As we have seen, the activation policy has been 
common to the four countries and strengthened in recent years, while all the other 
changes (which are less visible) were applied more gradually and to different degrees in 
the four countries. This political option can be explained by the greater public support 
for activation than for measures intended explicitly to cut benefits (Taylor-Gooby 2001; 
Bonoli et al. 2000). 
    The second issue/conclusion relates to the categorisation of the welfare changes. If 
the activation measures can be interpreted without any doubt as a systemic or structural 
change, the other cumulative changes in eligibility and entitlement could be construed 
as following a path-dependency trajectory.  However, there is a fundamental issue that 
should not be neglected, which concerns the link between work and individual social 
rights. As we mentioned above, the four insurance schemes as representative of the 
conservative welfare regime would grant unemployment protection based on the 
contributory principle, i.e. access was dependent on the previous contributions and the   17
duration of payment varied according to the insurance career. Not only do we observe a 
reinforcement of the work-relatedness principle, a trend already found in some other 
countries before 2003 (Clasen and Clegg 2007; Clegg 2007), but we can also identify a 
new conditionality in terms of the right to protection. Indeed, the receipt of insurance 
benefits has become strictly dependent on the active job search which may reveal a 
reconstruction of social protection on the basis of the future work prospects (Erhel and 
Zajdela 2004: 138). This reorientation of policy introduces a positive aspect, which is to 
promote a rapid (re)insertion of the unemployed into the labour market. However, it 
equally has a negative aspect in its consequences: the exclusion of unemployed 
individuals for reasons unrelated to their personal circumstances or efforts, such as 
persistent unemployment and low creation of jobs.  
        Finally, if it was possible to verify that the four countries adopted different 
instruments at different moments in time, no significant differences were detected in the 
reforms carried out in Portugal and Spain in comparison with France and Germany. 
This finding is in line with the argument of Palier and Martin (2007:547), according to 
whom the reforms developed by the so-called Bismarckian countries ´appeared to share 
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